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THE DETAINER PROCESS:
THE HIDDEN DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
IN PAROLE REVOCATION
When a parolee commits an intervening offense while on parole, he has
the right to a speedy trial on that offense' and the right to a prompt hearing
by the parole board on the question of whether his parole will be revoked.2
In practice, however, if the crime is committed in a federal or state
jurisdiction beyond the control of the original paroling authority, the revoca-
tion hearing is delayed until the parolee serves the intervening sentence. The
delay in holding the revocation hearing may severely limit the parolee's
chance for a fair revocation hearing by depriving him of the opportunity to
prevent reincarceration, preserve evidence, and gain concurrent sentences.
The delay results in a parole revocation warrant being lodged against
the prisoner which triggers a mechanism known as a detainer. The detainer
may adversely affect the parolee's conditions of confinement and deny him
access to various rehabilitation opportunities.3 The delay in conducting the
parole revocation hearing then serves to prolong the detrimental effects of
the detainer it initiated.
The federal and state courts apply a grievous loss test to determine
whether delay violates due process. 4  Whether the effects of delay cause
1. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
2. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
3. Shelton, Unconstitutional Uncertainty: A Study of the Use of Detainers, 1968
U. MicH. J.L. REF. 119, 122 [hereinafter cited as Shelton].
4. The federal cases opposed to delayed parole revocation proceedings, finding
delay causes grievous loss include: United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632
(7th Cir. 1975); Wingo v. Ciccone, 507 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1974); Wells v. Wise, 390 F.
Supp. 229 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974);
Jones v. Johnston, 368 F. Supp. 571 (D.D.C. 1974); Sutherland v. United States Board
of Parole, 366 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1973). The state cases opposed to delay, finding
delay causes grievous loss include: Wright v. Regan, 361 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1975); In re
Rixner, 39 Cal. App. 3d 465, 114 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1974); In re Valrie, 12 Cal. 3d 139,
524 P.2d 812, 115 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1974); Callison v. Michigan Department of Correc-
tions, 56 Mich. App. 260, 223 N.W.2d 738 (1974). The federal cases in favor of de-
layed parole revocation, finding delay does not cause grievous loss are: Small v. Britton,
500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974); Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974); Burdette v. Nock, 480 F.2d 1010 (6th
Cir. 1973); Noorlander v. United States Att'y Gen., 465 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973). The cases in favor of delayed parole revocation,
finding delay does not cause grievous loss include: Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308
(8th Cir. 1973); Pavia v. Hogan, 386 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974); State v. Sheehy,
114 N.H. 305, 337 A.2d 348 (1975); Duncan v. Ricketts, 232 Ga. 89, 205 S.E.2d 274
(1974).
NOTES
grievous loss depends on a balancing of the interests involved. 5 The more
important threshold question is whether the nature of the parolee's interest is
within the contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of the due
process clause. 6
Determination of whether due process requires a prompt revocation
hearing demands an understanding of the purpose of the parole revocation
hearing and the nature of the interests affected by revocation delay. This
writer believes that the proponents of delay misunderstand the purpose of
the hearing and undervalue the parolee's interests affected by delay. The
Supreme Court has refused to review the constitutionality of parole revoca-
tion delay when the parolee is serving time for an intervening crime.7 This
position should be reviewed in light of the confused and conflicting decisions
in the lower courts and the serious constitutional issues raised.
The prompt hearing proposed by some courts as a solution to the
adverse effects of parole revocation detainers is only a partial solution to the
effects of delay. Under such a proposal the parolee would no longer be
deprived of the opportunity to prevent reincarceration, preserve evidence
and gain concurrent sentences. The prompt hearing would also remove the
parole revocation detainer. The possibility remains, however, that the
parole board could impose consecutive sentencing at that hearing.8 In that
case, the detainer would remain intact as a consecutive sentence detainer
with the same adverse effects on the parolee's conditions of confinement and
opportunities for rehabilitation 9 as under a parole revocation detainer. Thus,
the due process violation attributable to the detainer would not be eliminat-
ed. This due process violation would amplify the consecutive sentencing
penalty.10 The only complete solution to the delay-detainer problem is one
which combines a prompt revocation hearing with elimination of the adverse
effects of the detainer mechanism.
5. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
6. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), quoted in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. at 480.
7. Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 846 (1974); Noorlander v. United States Att'y Gen., 465 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973).
8. United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975).
9. Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 CIUM. L. BULL., 669
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Dauber].
10. The consecutive sentence is amplified or made more burdensome due to the
continued existence of the detainer because prisoners consecutively sentenced are often
treated as maximum security risks and denied the opportunity to participate in rehabilita-
tion programs which require a less restrictive environment such as education, recreation
and work release programs. These limitations on freedom are supported by the assump-
tion that consecutive sentence prisoners are greater escape risks. This assumption is
completely destroyed in the article by Dauber, supra note 9 at 673, where he points out
that a person sentenced to six years for a crime will not necessarily have any less incen-
tive to escape than a prisoner with two three year consecutive sentences to be served
at different institutions.
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THE FACTUAL SETTING OF THE DELAYED
PAROLE REVOCATION HEARING
Familiarity with the factual circumstances which give rise to the
problems caused by delayed parole revocation hearings is basic to an
understanding of the constitutional controversy surrounding delay. The
problem begins when the petitioner is in the process of serving a sentence for
an offense constituting a violation of the conditions of parole granted from
an earlier federal or state sentence. Because the second offense constitutes a
parole violation, a parole violator warrant is issued by the original parole
authority and lodged as a detainer against the prisoner at his present place of
incarceration. Execution of the warrant and a hearing on the underlying
charges is delayed until the intervening sentence is completed in accordance
with a standard practice of the U.S. Parole Board, implemented by prison
officials acting as its agents." A similar policy is also followed by various
state parole boards.
12
The parole revocation warrant remains lodged as a detainer against the
prisoner until the intervening sentence is completed. The detainer is simply
a communication sent to the prison, usually by the parole board, asking to be
informed by the prison officials when the inmate serving the intervening
sentence is to be released.' 3 Parole revocation detainers can be like a
consecutive sentence detainer in that the parole board has the discretion to
hold open the possibility of making the parolee serve the remainder of his
original sentence after completion of the intervening sentence. 14  Thus,
pending action by the parole board, consecutive sentence status may be
imposed de facto upon the prisoner who has a revocation detainer lodged
against him. Prisoners who are consecutively sentenced are often classified
as maximum security risks and denied the opportunity to participate in
rehabilitation programs which require a less restrictive environment such as
education, recreation and work release programs.' 5 These limitations on
freedom are supported by the assumption that consecutive sentence prisoners
are greater escape risks.' 6
Significantly, state parolees who commit state crimes in the paroling
state, or federal parolees who commit other federal crimes in the same
11. Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 846 (1974).
12. In Illinois, although the policy is to grant a revocation hearing promptly, in
practice, if the crime is committed in a federal or state jurisdiction beyond the control of
the original paroling authorities, then the revocation hearing is delayed until the interven-
ing sentence is completed, according to interviews conducted November 19, 1975 with
Jeffrey Doane, Legal Counsel for the Illinois Parole Board, and Lawrence Pusateri,
former President of the Illinois Bar Association and co-author of Illinois' New Unified
Code of Corrections, 61 ILL. B.J. 62 (1972).
13. Dauber, supra note 9, at 673.
14. United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975).
15. Shelton, supra note 3, at 122.
16. Id.
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district are not subjected to the deprivations which result from delayed
parole revocation hearings. The state or federal authorities in that situation
have no reason to issue and leave unexecuted a parole violator warrant
acting as a detainer, because the prisoner is already present at the original
custodial institution. However, when the parolee commits a dissimilar 17
intervening crime, both federal and state parole boards circumvent the
requirement for prompt revocation hearing by treating the parolee as a
person with a "hold-order" over him, warranting postponement of revocation
until the sentence for the intervening crime is served.' 8
The federal and state courts disagree as to whether this practice violates
due process by causing grievous loss to the parolee-prisoner.' 9  Their
conflicting interpretation of grievous loss is due to a fundamental disagree-
ment as to the nature of the parolee's interest and the purpose of the
revocation hearing. The Supreme Court delineated a grievous loss test in
Morrissey v. Brewer20 to determine whether due process was violated by
denying prisoners the right to a parole revocation hearing. An understand-
ing of the grievous loss test as applied in Morrissey is the starting point for
clarifying the issues raised by the delay controversy.
THE GRIEVOUS Loss TEST As APPLIED To DELAYED
PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS
The Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer2" first recognized the
parolee's right to due process within the context of a parole revocation
hearing. The Court rejected the concept that the right to due process in a
parole revocation context depended upon whether the parolee's liberty was
characterized as a right or as a privilege. In Morrissey, two parolees
appealed on the ground that their paroles were revoked without a hearing,
depriving them of due process. The court of appeals in affirming the district
court, had reasoned that parole is only a "correctional device authorizing
service of sentence outside a penitentiary." It concluded that a parolee is
thus still "in custody," and not entitled to a full adversary hearing, as he
would be in a criminal proceeding.
In reversing the court of appeals decision, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the parolee's interests were of such a nature as to invoke the protection
of due process:
[Tihe liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of
the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts
a "grievous loss" on the parolee and often on others. It is hardly
17. A "dissimilar" intervening crime is one committed in a federal or state
jurisdiction beyond the control of the original paroling authorities.
18. Shelton, supra note 3, at 119 n.10.
19. Cases cited supra note 4.
20. 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
21. Id.
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useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of
whether the parolee's liberty is a "right" or a "privilege." By
whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination
calls for some orderly process, however informal.
22
Thus, the Court recognized that the nature of the parolee's interest is within
the contemplation of the "liberty" language of the due process clause. The
court defined grievous loss as termination of the parolee's liberty without
some orderly revocation procedure.
The Court concluded that due process required two stages in the
revocation procedure. First, there must be a prompt informal inquiry near
the place of the alleged parole violation to determine whether the alleged
violation can be substantiated by probable cause. 23  Second, following this
preliminary hearing, a full revocation hearing must be held "within a
reasonable time." The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether the
parolee should be reincarcerated for the protection of society, to consider
mitigating evidence, and to decide what steps should be taken toward
rehabilitating the parolee. The Court indicated an understanding that the
purpose of the revocation hearing goes beyond whether the parolee should
be reincarcerated for the violation, and should include consideration of
mitigating evidence and rehabilitation possibilities.
24
The Court concluded that whether any procedural protections are due
depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer
grievous loss."' 25 The grievous loss test requires a balancing of the govern-
mental interests furthered by delay against those interests of the parolee
which delay affects adversely. 26 The important question, as Morrissey
noted, is not the weight of the individual interests, but whether the nature of
the interests is within the contemplation of the "liberty or property" language
of the due process clause.
27
The Court failed to resolve, however, whether hearing delay causes
grievous loss when the parolee is in the custody of a different governmental
22. Id. at 484.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 488.
25. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951),
quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) and quoted in Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
26. Beshers v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1975). Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 532, 533 (1972). In holding that petitioner's right to a speedy trial is subject
to a balancing test, the decision analogously supports the application of a similar
balancing test to parole revocation delay because similar interests are at stake. The
Supreme Court said that loss must be assessed in light of the the interests of the
petitioner including: (1) Prevention of oppressive incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety
and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.
27. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), quoted in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480 (1972).
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authority serving a sentence for an intervening crime. Courts are split on
what constitutes grievous loss. 28  The way in which courts regard the nature
of the parolee's interest and the purpose of the revocation hearing signifi-
cantly affects their conclusions on the question of grievous loss.
In applying the due process analysis the proponents of delay never
utilized a balancing test because they concluded that the parolee had no
constitutionally protected interest. 29  Although these courts recognize that
the parolee's liberty is being denied without a hearing, they contend that this
consideration is no longer compelling because the conviction for the interven-
ing crime justifies the deprivation of liberty.30
According to the proponents of delay, the sole purpose of a revocation
hearing is to decide whether parole should be revoked.3 1 Their test for
grievous loss reflects this emphasis. A prisoner must demonstrate that delay
adversely affected the decision to revoke parole. In most cases, the
parolee's conviction for the intervening crime will provide sufficient legal
justification for revoking parole.32 If parole is revoked as a result of the
intervening conviction then implicitly the parolee will be unable to demon-
strate to the satisfaction of these courts that delay of the hearing caused
grievous loss. 33
Other courts oppose a test which requires a prisoner to demonstrate that
28. Cases cited note 4 supra.
29. The federal cases in favor of delayed revocation hearings, finding delay does
not cause grievous loss are: Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974); Cook v.
United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846
(1974); Burdette v. Nock, 480 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1973); Noorlander v. United States
Att'y Gen., 465 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973).
The state cases favoring delay, finding no grievous loss caused by delay are: Cooper
v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973); Pavia v. Hogan, 386 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D.
Ga. 1974); State v. Sheehy, 114 N.H. 305, 337 A.2d 348 (1975); Duncan v. Ricketts,
232 Ga. 89, 205 S.E.2d 274 (1974).
30. Cases cited note 29 supra.
31. Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299, 301, 302 (10th Cir. 1974). In Small no
consideration was given to any other possible disadvantageous consequences of the
hearing delay. In approving the delay, the court, instead focused solely on the fact that
petitioner did not show how an earlier hearing could have affected the outcome of the
revocation hearing which was finally held.
32. Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974). The Court in Cook emphasized the fact of parolee's
conviction for an intervening crime. "We are unable to conclude on this record that the
extent of such deprivation is so great or so unreasonably related to the very existence of
a detainer based as it is in this case on a serious and incontestable parole violation, as to
require that the revocation hearing be held at the commencement of the intervening
sentence." Id. at 673.
33. Id. at 673. The Fifth Circuit concluded, "We do not close our eyes to the
fact that appellee may have been disadvantaged in certain respects by the deferral of
the revocation hearing, but we are unable to conclude that the disadvantage constitutes
such grievous loss-in due process terms as to require the hearing to be held prior to
service of the intervening sentence or to permit the intrusion by a court into this highly
discretionary activity." Id. at 671.
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delay adversely affected the decision to revoke parole.8 4 These courts reject
the contention that lack of evidence sufficient to alter a conviction and
subsequent revocation eliminates the need for a prompt hearing. The test
which these courts apply for grievous loss is not merely whether delay will
affect the outcome of the revocation hearing, but also whether delay will
cause further curtailment of the parolee's freedom when he is convicted of an
intervening crime.
8 5
These courts illustrate an understanding that the nature of the parolee's
interest is within the contemplation of the "liberty" language of the due
process clause. They recognize that, notwithstanding the intervening convic-
tion, a delayed parole revocation hearing may violate the parolee's freedom
causing grievous loss. 3 6 They conclude that delay may curtail freedom by
depriving the parolee of a chance to obtain concurrent sentencing thereby
causing a longer total period of imprisonment or by restricting, via the
detainer mechanism, his conditions of confinement while in prison.
The courts which use curtailment of liberty as the test for grievous loss
further illustrate an understanding that the purpose of the hearing goes
beyond merely considering the question of whether parole should be re-
voked.37  The import of these decisions is that a conviction during parole
does not dispense with the need for a hearing although it may alter its
content.38 The hearing is still required to consider mitigating evidence and
concurrent sentencing, factors which are intricately related to the parolee's
interest in freedom.
The different ways in which the courts regard the nature of the parolee's
right and the purpose of the hearing account for their conflicting interpreta-
tions of what constitutes grievous loss. An examination of the reasons
34. The federal cases which apply a curtailment of liberty test to determine
whether grievous loss results from delay are: United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520
F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975); Beshers v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1975); Wingo v.
Ciccone, 507 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1974); Wade v. United States Bd. of Parole, 392 F.
Supp. 327 (E.D. Wash. 1975); Wells v. Wise, 390 F. Supp. 229 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Arnold v. United States Bd. of Parole, 390 F. Supp. 1177 (D.D.C. 1975); Fitzgerald v.
Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974); Jones v. Johnston, 368 F. Supp. 571 (D.D.C.
1974); Sutherland v. District of Columbia, 366 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1973). The state
cases which apply a curtailment of liberty test to determine whether grievous loss results
from delay are: Wright v. Regan, 46 App. Div. 2d 163, 361 N.Y.S.2d 437 (4th Dep't
1975); In re Rixner, 39 Cal. App. 3d 465, 114 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1974); In re Valrie,
12 Cal. 3d 139, 524 P.2d 812, 115 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1974); Callison v. Michigan Depart-
ment of Corrections, 56 Mich. App. 260, 223 N.W.2d 738 (1974).
35. See cases cited note 34 supra.
36. See cases cited note 34 supra.
37. See cases cited note 34 supra.
38. A conviction during parole may alter the content of a revocation hearing, since
the question of parole violation is proven by the conviction for the intervening crime and
need not be reconsidered. However, the hearing is still required to consider mitigating
evidence and concurrent sentencing which are intricately related to the parolee's interest
in freedom.
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advanced in support of their opposing conclusions is crucial to a complete
understanding of the delay problem and all its ramifications.
JUDICIAL RESPONSE To THE PROBLEM OF
DELAYED PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS
Delay-Approving Rationale
The delay-approving courts conclude that the nature of the parolee's
interests affected by delay are not within the contemplation of the "liberty or
property" language of the due process clause.39 Their rationale for this
position is two-fold. First, they rely on statutory language to support this
judicial conclusion.40  Second, they contend that the right to a revocation
hearing can be conditioned on the parolee's completion of the intervening
sentence, because prisoners incarcerated for intervening crime have no
interest in liberty worthy of constitutional protection.
41
When the federal government is the revoking authority, its argument in
favor of delay has the benefit of statutory language providing that the timing
of the revocation hearing is conditioned upon the revoking authority's actual
custody over the parolee-prisoner. 42  Some states have the benefit of
similar statutory language which authorizes delay. 43
39. Cases cited note 29 supra.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1970) provides:
A prisoner retaken upon a warrant issued by the Board of Parole, shall be
given an opportunity to appear before the Board, a member thereof, or an
examiner designated by the Board.
The Board may then, or at any time in its discretion, revoke the order of
parole and terminate such parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof.
If such order of parole shall be revoked and the parole so terminated, the
said prisoner may be required to serve all or any part of the remainder of the
term for which he was sentenced (emphasis added).
28 C.F.R. § 2.40 (1975) the implementing regulation for 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (Supp. 1975)
provides:
A prisoner who is retaken pursuant to a warrant issued by the Board or a
member thereof shall, while being held in custody under authority of such
warrant awaiting possible return to a Federal institution, be afforded a pre-
liminary interview by an official designated by the Board. Following receipt
of a summary or digest of the preliminary interview, the Board shall afford the
prisoner an opportunity to appear before the Board, a member thereof, or an
examiner designated by the Board. If the prisoner requests a local hearing
prior to return to a Federal institution in order to facilitate the retention of
counsel or the production of witnesses, and if he has not been convicted of a
crime committed while under community supervision, and if he denies that he
has violated any condition of his release, he shall be afforded a local revoca-
tion hearing reasonably near the place of the alleged violation. . . Otherwise,
he shall be given a revocation hearing after he is returned to a Federal institu-
tion. Following the revocation hearing, the Board may then or at any time
within its discretion revoke and terminate the order of parole or mandatory
release or modify the terms and conditions thereof. ...
41. See Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974); Trimmings v. Henderson,
498 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1974); Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974); Noorlander v. United States Att'y Gen., 465
F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973).
42. Cases cited note 41 supra.
43. See, e.g., Duncan v. Ricketts, 232 Ga. 89, 205 S.E.2d 284 (1974); GA. CODE
ANN. § 77-159 (1971).
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The federal statute governing parole revocation provides that a parolee
is entitled to a hearing only after he is retaken upon a warrant and returned
to federal custody. The parolee is not returned to federal custody until the
parole violator warrant is executed. 44  While a parole violator's warrant
must be issued within the maximum term of the sentence in accordance with
the federal parole statute, it need not be executed during this period.
45
Instead, the warrant may be held in abeyance, while the parolee serves his
sentence under an intervening conviction, the occurrence of which prompted
the issuance of the violator's warrant, and may then be executed following
completion of the intervening sentence.
46
The delay-approving courts emphasize that both statute and precedent
sanction conducting parole revocation hearings after execution of the war-
44. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (Supp. 1975) provides that a parolee is entitled to a hearing
only after the warrant is executed by the authority taking the parolee back into custody.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added) provides:
A warrant for the retaking of any United States prisoner who has violated his
parole, may be issued only by the Board of Parole or a member thereof and
within the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced. The unex-
pired term of imprisonment of any such prisoner shall begin to run from the
date he is returned to the custody of the Attorney General under said war-
rant, and the time the prisoner was on parole shall not diminish the time he
was sentenced to serve.
It should be noted, in conjunction with sections 4205 and 4207 of Title 18 that one
rationale for delaying the revocation hearing is that upon execution of the parole
revocation warrant the prior sentence automatically runs concurrently with the interven-
ing sentence. The delay approving courts maintain that delay of the revocation hearing
is necessary in order to protect the discretion of the parole board to decide that the
remainder of the original sentence should run consecutively to the intervening sentence.
See, e.g., Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667, 670 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974).
In order to avoid the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (Supp. 1975) which causes the
original sentence to run concurrently with the intervening sentence upon execution of the
parole revocation warrant, it is a common parole board practice to lodge the warrant as a
detainer, but to delay its execution, and thus the hearing thereon, until just prior to
completion of the sentence being served. This rationalization finds support in the pre-
Morrissey case of Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359 (1938). See also Noorlander v.
United States Att'y Gen., 465 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938
(1973); Tanner v. Moseley, 441 F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 1971); Hash v. Henderson, 385 F.2d
475 (8th Cir. 1967).
The Seventh Circuit recently confronted the conflict between a prompt hearing
requirement and parole board discretion. The court recognized that according to the
policy, if a revocation hearing must be held shortly after a parolee is incarcerated for an
offense committed while on release, the board is required to execute the warrant prior to
such hearing. Execution of the warrant causes the parolee's initial unexpired sentence to
automatically run, and as a result, the board would not be able to penalize parole
violators by imposing the unexpired sentence to run consecutively to the intervening
sentence. The solution of the Seventh Circuit was to require a hearing prior to the
execution of the warrant. Execution of the warrant is no longer a condition precedent
to the revocation hearing and the parole board's discretion to impose consecutive sen-
tences at that hearing remains fully intact. See United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520
F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975).
46. See, e.g., Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667, 670 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974).
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rant, and place no limits on the time which may elapse between issuance and
execution of the warrant.4 Considerations of administrative convenience
provide additional justification for imposing actual custody over the parolee-
prisoner as a condition precedent to the vesting of the hearing right.48 These
courts have emphasized the inconvenience of requiring the governmental
unit not having custody to carry out a revocation hearing by either transport-
ing prisoners to the revoking authority, transporting parole officers to the
prisoner, or holding ex parte proceedings.
49
One state and two federal courts relying on statutory authority have
reasoned that execution of the warrant by the revoking authority taking
actual custody of the parolee triggers the duty to provide a parole revocation
hearing.50  They contend that the "in custody" statutory requirement is
consistent with due process since Morrissey only requires that a revocation
hearing take place within a reasonable time after the parolee is "taken into
custody."'51 The crux of their argument is that a parolee is "taken into cus-
tody" when returned to the custody of the revoking authority. These courts
concluded that the parole board need not grant a Morrissey type revocation
hearing to a parolee at the commencement of a sentence for a crime commit-
ted while on parole where a parole violator warrant has been issued but
47. Id. at 671.
48. See, e.g., Noorlander v. United States Att'y Gen., 465 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973). The court pointed out that the law is well
established that it is the issuance of the warrant by the parole board and not its
execution that must be within the statutory period. Any other rule, noted the court,
would subject the board to obvious administrative difficulties that would frequently
render enforcement impossible.
49. Other courts, however, have pointed out that administrative inconvenience is no
excuse for constitutional deprivation and such inconvenience to parole authorities can be
reduced by careful planning.
The Supreme Court foresaw that there would be some disruptive impact which
would inevitably follow from the rule that due process was required for parole revoca-
tion. The Court stressed that flexibility would be allowed in revocation proceedings:
While in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to live testimony,
we emphasize that we did not intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the
conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, depositions,
documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the states from hold-
ing both the preliminary and the final hearings at the place of violation or
from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the
Morrissey requirements.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973).
In Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308, 317 (8th Cir. 1973), the court confronted the
practical administrative objections of implementing the prompt parole revocation hear-
ings. The court pointed out that the custody state and the state requesting the delay
might work out informal procedures that would furnish the latter with adequate informa-
tion on which to exercise its judgment whether or not to continue the delay.
50. Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 499 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 846 (1974); see also Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974);
Trimmings v. Henderson, 498 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1975); Duncan v. Ricketts, 232 Ga. 89,
205 S.E.2d 274 (1974).
51. See cases cited note 50 supra.
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returned unexecuted pending completion of the intervening sentence and
return to the custody of the revoking authority.
52
A second argument made by the federal courts in favor of delaying the
revocation hearing is that conviction for an intervening crime warrants delay
until the intervening sentence is served and the prisoner is returned to the
custody of the revoking authority. 53 Implicit in the acceptance by the courts
of the statutory requirement that a prisoner be returned to the custody of the
revoking authority before his right to a hearing vests is the assumption that
prisoners incarcerated for intervening crimes have no interest in liberty
worthy of constitutional protection. 54
Delay-Critical Rationale
The delay-critical courts conclude that the nature of the parolee's
interests affected by delay are within the contemplation of the "liberty"
language of the due process clause. The Seventh Circuit very recently
recognized that such delay severely curtailed the liberty of the parolee-
prisoner resulting in a violation of due process. 55 Among the elements of
curtailed liberty noted by the court as sufficient to meet the grievous loss test
of Morrissey were: prejudice in the opportunity to defend against the
violation charged or to demonstrate mitigating evidence, and loss of the
chance for concurrent sentencing causing a longer total period of imprison-
ment.56
An individual's right to due process in the parole revocation context is
not only protected from direct infringement, but also from indirect infringe-
ment such as the conditioning of that right on the completion of an
intervening criminal sentence.57  Protection of an individual's right to due
process from indirect infringement is sometimes called the doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions," which has found expression in judicial opinions
dealing with diverse government benefits.58
The Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell59 extended to prisoners the
52. See cases cited note 50 supra.
53. See cases cited note 41 supra.
54. See cases cited note 29 supra.
55. United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975).
56. ld. at 635.
57. See, e.g., Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35
COLuM. L. REv. 321 (1935); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HA v. L. REv. 1595,
1596 (1960).
58. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 493 (1972) (parole revocation
hearings); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
465 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969) (welfare benefits); Pickering v. Board of Education, 393 U.S.
563, 568 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (striking down
discriminatory unemployment compensation statute that denied benefits to Seventh Day
Adventist who refused to work on Saturday).
59. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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due process guarantees recognized in Morrissey6" as applicable to parolees.
Although Morrissey and Wolff are most important for their statement of the
principles underlying the grant or denial of due process, their teachings on
unconstitutional conditioning of prisoner rights are particularly relevant to
the delay problem. These two cases provide the most compelling constitu-
tional answer to hearing delay supported by statutory language and condi-
tioned on the parolee's completion of the intervening sentence.
The courts which favor a prompt hearing have concluded that Morris-
sey, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Wolff, rejects the argument that
the parolee-prisoner has no right to a revocation hearing until the revoking
authority regains actual custody.6 1 Although Wolff did not extend all of
Morrissey's procedural protections to the inmate, the court held that
minimal due process requirements, including notice and hearing must be
provided in prison disciplinary proceedings.62 This clarification of Morris-
sey's application to prisoners still in the penitentiary as well as to those who
are at liberty on parole would seem to prohibit conditioning the right to a
revocation hearing on completion of the intervening sentence.63 It under-
cuts the conclusion of the delay-approving courts that a parolee serving an
intervening sentence does not have a right to revocation hearing and notice
as long as he is in prison for that intervening crime and not in the custody of
the revoking authorities. As the Court emphasized in Wolff, "though his
rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional
environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections
when he is imprisoned for crime."'6
4
An examination of the purpose of the parole revocation hearing reveals
that the timing of the hearing cannot be conditioned on the completion of the
intervening sentence. Wolff's impact on the question of prisoner's constitu-
tional rights has gone beyond the context of prison disciplinary proceed-
ings.6 5 Some federal courts have interpreted Wolff as invalidating the
distinction made by delay-approving courts between a parole violator war-
rant which has been merely issued and one which has been executed.66 They
have rejected the holding of these courts that the time at which a hearing
must be held is controlled by execution of a warrant. 67 Further, they have
60. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
61. See, e.g., Pavia v. Hogan, 386 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
62. 418 U.S. 539, 542 (1974).
63. Pavia v. Hogan, 386 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
64. 418 U.S. at 555.
65. Although Wolff dealt with prison discipline, its extension of due process to
prisoners undermines the argument that a parolee serving an intervening sentence does
not have a right to Morrissey protection as long as he is in prison for that intervening
crime. "See also Pavia v. Hogan, 386 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
66. See Beshers v, Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1975); Pavia v. Hogan, 386 F.
Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
67. See cases cited note 66 supra.
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not accepted the conclusion that a warrant is not executed until the prisoner
is released from his intervening confinement and retaken into custody. They
have concluded that the assumption that a prisoner's rights under Morrissey
hang in suspended animation until he has served his intervening sentence is
not consistent with Wolff's apparent rejection of the custodial status of the
prisoner as determinative of when a prisoner's constitutional rights vest.68
The conclusion of the delay-critical courts that the revocation hearing
should occur before the intervening sentence is served is supported by the
holding in Wolff that the nature of due process requires that a hearing be
conducted at a "meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."6 9  The
courts which favor timely revocation hearings recognize the fact that revoca-
tion and subsequent reincarceration do not always follow, even where the
parole violation was the commission of another crime. 70 They recognize
that the nature of the hearing is such that delay may result in the loss of
essential witnesses or evidence and the continuation of unnecessary incarcer-
ation or other limitations on personal liberty. 7' A prompt hearing to adduce
evidence on these matters is of vital importance even to a parolee whose
parole violation has already been established by a court of law.
While it is true that the fact of the parolee-prisoner's guilt cannot be
relitigated, the revocation hearing may provide an opportunity for him to
present certain mitigating circumstances affecting revocation and sen-
tencing. 7 2 Recently, the Seventh Circuit, finding the reasoning of the Eighth
68. Pavia v. Hogan, 386 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
69. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 550 (1972) which held there is a basic requirement of notice where the result
of a judicial proceeding was permanently to deprive a legitimate parent of all rights to
the child. In so holding the court noted that a fundamental requirement of due process
is the opportunity to be heard which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.
70. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784 & n.8 (1973); Cooper v. Lockhart, 489
F.2d 308, 314 & n.11 (8th Cir. 1973); DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO
TYPE, LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 283, 369-74 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
DAWSON]. It should be noted that taking no action and returning the parolee to the
institution are not the only alternatives available to the parole board. According to the
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, REPORT ON
CORRECTIONS 407 (1973), short term confinement or special restrictions can be useful
in dealing with parolees instead of an automatic return to long term confinement.
71. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374
(1969); Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973). In Smith, the Supreme
Court showed concern that the defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at
least partially concurrent with the one he is serving and the possibility for concurrent
sentencing may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed. 393 U.S. at
378. The court in Cooper, relying on Smith, said the possibility for concurrent sentenc-
ing is just as much obscured and "forever lost" if a parole revocation hearing is
postponed. 489 F.2d at 310.
72. The Supreme Court has recognized that the effect of delay on the preservation
of evidence may very well impair the ability of an accused to defend himself. While
evidence and witnesses disappear, memories fade, and events lose their perspective, a
man isolated in prison is powerless to exert his own investigative efforts to combat these
erosive effects of the passage of time. Postponement of the adjudication of issues can
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Circuit persuasive, concluded that a parole violator has a substantial interest
in presenting mitigating facts that could influence the parole board either to
set aside the warrant or to execute it, giving the violator the benefit of
concurrent sentences.
73
Finally, the courts which favor timely hearings note that not only the
prisoner, but society as well has an interest in providing a fair revocation
hearing. The Supreme Court in Morrissey noted:
Society has an interest in not having parole revoked because of
erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation of
the need to revoke parole, given the breach of parole conditions.
Society has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic
harm both the prisoner and the state and lessens the probability that final disposition of
the case will do substantial justice. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Peyton v.
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 62 (1968).
73. United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975). It should
be noted that a prior federal sentence can be served concurrently with a subsequent state
sentence being served in a state institution.
The question of concurrent sentencing raises the sensitive problem of conflicting
sovereignties. In Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974), the sentencing
judge ordered the sentence imposed by him to run concurrently with any other sentence
then being served by petitioner. The petitioner alleged that by deferring action on the
parole violation warrant and, thus, deferring the running of the original unexpired
sentence until completion of the intervening sentence, the parole board caused the
unexpired sentence to run consecutively to the intervening sentence, thereby frustrating
the clear intention of the original sentencing judge. The court held that the parole board
had not usurped the power of the sentencing judge by preventing the intervening and
unexpired sentences from running concurrently.
In Tippit v. Wood, 140 F.2d 689, 692 (D.D.C. 1944), in which the petitioner had
committed a criminal offense while on parole from a previous conviction, the district
court imposed a sentence that required the intervening sentence and the unexpired
portion of the original sentence to run concurrently with each other. The appellate
court ruled the sentence invalid and held that the sentencing judge had no power to make
the intervening sentence run concurrent with the original unexpired sentence, or to tell
the parole board how it must act in light of the intervening sentence. The rule has been
that the parole board has the administrative power to decide whether a sentence for an
offense committed while on parole will run concurrent with the unexpired portion of the
original sentence, imposed because of parole violation. The power of the board in this
area has been held to be exclusive. Cox v. Feldkamp, 438 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1971).
An unusual sentencing situation recently confronted the Seventh Circuit in United
States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975). It should be noted,
however, that the sentencing situation in Hahn is distinct from the situation previously
described. In Hahn, state and federal sentences were judicially imposed concurrently
prior to the intervening crime committed by petitioner while on parole. The intervening
state sentence was served and completed after four months. After that sentence,
petitioner Hahn remained incarcerated in an Illinois state prison serving the time
remaining on his original Illinois state sentence consecutively with the federal sentence.
The federal authorities by delaying the parole revocation decision prevented the federal
sentence from running. This action, in effect modified the concurrent sentencing orders
of the federal and state judges imposed prior to any conviction for intervening criminal
activity. The only decision the federal parole board had the authority to make was that
the four month sentence for the intervening crime committed while on parole should not
be served concurrent to any previous sentence. The parole board had no authority to
modify the two previous sentences which both federal and state judges had imposed
concurrently.
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fairness; fair treatment will enhance the chance of rehabilitation
by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.
74
In summary, the "in custody" rationale for hearing postponement,
whether supported by considerations of statutory language or the parolee's
status as prisoner, is unacceptable because delay deprives the prisoner of a
timely hearing when timing goes to the very essence of due process in terms
of grievous loss to the prisoner. The custodial status of the revoking
authority via the agency of the actual custodial authority should, therefore,
be held sufficient to satisfy the "in custody" requirement. Statutory
interpretation cannot sustain constitutional loopholes for violation of due
process. Nor can the status of the parolee as prisoner incarcerated for an
intervening crime justify constitutionally distorted "conditional" due process
which sustains the adverse effects of delay on the prisoner's interests.
The courts which recognize that delay causes grievous loss illustrate an
understanding of the nature of the parolee's interest and of the purpose of
the revocation hearing. They fail to realize, however, that a prompt hearing
is only a partial solution to grievous loss caused by delay. The courts have
held that the detainer effects are themselves a due process violation. Yet,
they have failed to integrate the constitutional problems raised by detainers
under the grievous loss analysis with their prompt hearing solution.
Implementation of a prompt revocation hearing will not necessarily
eliminate the adverse effects of the detainer on the parolee's conditions of
confinement and rehabilitation opportunities. Although hearing delay trig-
gers the detainer mechanism, the detainer will only be removed if concurrent
sentences are imposed at the revocation hearing. If consecutive sentences
are imposed, the detainer remains intact as a consecutive sentence detainer
with the same limiting effects on the prisoner's liberty. Thus, the due
process violation attributable to the detainer is not eliminated. This due
process violation amplifies the consecutive sentencing penalty. A recent
major decision in the Seventh Circuit illustrated the need for more than a
prompt parole revocation hearing to remedy the adverse effects of the
detainer process.7 5
THE DETAINER: AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM
In United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis,7 6 the Seventh Circuit confront-
ed the question of whether delaying a parole revocation hearing and thereby
prolonging the effects of the revocation detainer can cause grievous loss in
due process terms to the prisoner. The petitioner was sentenced on a state
and federal charge. Both the state and federal sentencing judges ordered
74. 408 U.S. 484 (1972).
75. United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975).
76. Id.
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that the sentences be served concurrently. While on parole from the federal
prison, the parolee was convicted and sentenced to four months for battery.
After completion of the short sentence he remained in prison on the original
state charge while the Federal Board of Parole delayed the parol revocation
decision and caused the parole violation warrant to be lodged against the
prisoner as a detainer. The Federal Parole Board thereby held open the
possibility that the remainder of the original federal sentence would be
served consecutive to the state sentence and contrary to the explicit intention
of both the federal and state sentencing judges.77  The Federal Parole
Board likewise prolonged the effects of the detainer on the prisoner as long
as he served the state sentence consecutive to the federal sentence.
78
The Seventh Circuit held that due process mandated a prompt revoca-
tion hearing.79 The court recognized that the parolee-prisoner suffered
grievous loss from the effects of the delayed hearing and the outstanding
detainer. Among the elements of grievous loss which the court recognized
were: Impairment of rehabilitation due to the existence of the detainer;
prejudice in the opportunity to defend against the violation charged or to
demonstrate mitigating evidence; and loss of the chance for concurrent
sentencing causing a longer total period of imprisonment.80
Although the holding of the Seventh Circuit requires a prompt revoca-
tion hearing, it leaves the parole board with the same discretionary power to
withdraw, execute, or retain the warrant lodged as a detainer thereby
providing only a partial solution to the constitutional prob!emr caused by
delayed revocation hearings. The loss of evidence and the loss of a chance
for concurrent sentencing would be prevented by Hahn's prompt hearing
requirement. However, even if the revocation hearing were held and
parole were revoked, the parole board could still make a decision resulting
in grievous loss to the parolee-prisoner by deciding to retain the warrant as a
consecutive sentence detainer. Only if the prisoner were sentenced concur-
rently on both the intervening crime and the original crime for which the
prisoner was paroled would the removal of the detainer be guaranteed. If
parole were revoked, but no concurrent sentence granted, the detainer would
remain intact as a consecutive sentence detainer making the prisoner's
ultimate sentence unclear, adversely affecting his conditions of confinement
and undermining rehabiltation efforts.8 '
77. Id. at 635.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 637.
80. The Seventh Circuit relied on Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439
(1973) and Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) to support its finding of grievous loss
from hearing delay in the areas of rehabilitation, concurrent sentencing and loss of
evidence.
81. Dauber, supra note 9, at 697. "The greatest cost of detainers to the criminal
justice system and to society as a whole is interference with the rehabilitation of inmates
• . .the presence of detainers needlessly complicates rehabilitation efforts by interfering
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Hahn illustrates the necessity for an evaluation of the effects of
detainers on prisoners regardless of their origin. The constitutional sufficien-
cy of Hahn's partial solution is controversial. The courts disagree as to
whether the adverse effects of detainers are grievous enough in due process
terms to warrant prevention by either banning the use of detainers complete-
ly or at least mitigating their effects.
Nature and Effects of Detainers
A detainer is a creature of convenience under which an authority
having custody of a prisoner, upon request from another jurisdiction agrees
to hold the prisoner pending release on another charge.8 2 The detainer can
be a copy of an arrest warrant, indictment, or commitment order, or simply a
letter or note sent to the prison by a prosecutor, court, police chief, parole
board or any other official empowered to take people into custody, asking to
be informed by the prison officials when the inmate in question is to be
released. 83  Having no force in law, the detainer is at best a matter of
comity or compact and assures that the prisoner will not abscond after
release in one jurisdiction before he can be held to account for unresolved
charges in another.
8 4
Detainers affect the prisoner's conditions of confinement and the nature
of his rehabilitation opportunities.8 5 The existence of a detainer often
results in a maximum security classification with attendant restrictions of
freedoms.8 6 Prisoners subject to detainers are prevented from participating
in work release programs as well as various educational and recreational
programs.8 7  The psychological effects of the detainer on the prisoner are
also notable. Anxiety from the uncertainty of future imprisonment and
depression from the nature of the inmate's current conditions of confinement
may leave the prisoner with little inclination toward self-improvement.88 The
with programming, reducing inmate's incentive, preoccupying his attention, and limiting
his participation in certain minimal-custody programs."
82. Beshers v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082, 1088 (8th Cir. 1975).
83. Dauber, supra note 9, at 670.
84. Beshers v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082, 1088 (8th Cir. 1975).
85. Shelton, supra note 3, at 119, 122. In Jacob and Sharma, Justice After Trial:
Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L.
RPv. 493, 582 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Jacob and Sharma] the authors point out
that detainers sometimes are filed not to meet the needs of other agencies for a particular
inmate, but as an additional means of punishing the inmate. Punitive consequences of a
detainer placed on the prisoner vary from one institution to another. "Many detainers
are filed for punitive reasons and are later withdrawn or not enforced, having served
their purpose by curtailing prison privileges and preventing parole. It is openly admitted
by some prosecutors that detainers are sometimes filed without intent to prosecute, but
rather to bar parole or make parole more difficult, thereby punishing the inmate for the
offense though he has not yet been tried or convicted. It is estimated that less than half
of all filed detainers are exercised or filed with any intention of being enforced."
86. Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308, 314 & n. 10 (8th Cir. 1973).
87. Dauber, supra note 9, at 692, 693.
88. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
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rationale often advanced by the custodial authority for the added restrictions
placed on the detainer prisoner is that an inmate with a detainer, regardless
of its form or substance, must be watched more carefully. 9
The Validity of a Detainer's Effects in Due Process Terms
For two reasons, courts have been reluctant to find that parole violation
warrants lodged as detainers cause constitutionally cognizable grievous loss.
First, they justify the effects of the detainer by the fact of the underlying
conviction, and second, they devalue the detainer's effects by deferring to the
administrative expertise of the detainer-requesting authorities.90
Noorlander v. United States Board of Parole91 typifies an approach
recognizing the adverse effect of treating inmates with detainers differently
than other prisoners, but finding that the underlying conviction rationally
supports the different treatment.9 2 In Noorlander, the prisoner, alleging
violation of due process, argued that the presence of the detainer made his
intervening sentence more burdensome without any proceedings to determine
the propriety of the increased harshness. The prisoner contended that the
outstanding detainer rendered him ineligible for lower security custody and a
variety of rehabilitation programs. The court responded that although the
effect of the detainer may have rendered the prisoner's intervening sentence
more burdensome than the sentences of other inmates not subject to a
detainer, the intervening conviction justified the existence of the detainer and
its adverse effects on the prisoner. 98
In the court's opinion, to hold otherwise would have been tantamount to
requiring correctional administrators to ignore the past records and behavior
of prisoners. A different case might be presented, the court noted, if the
89. Bennett, The Last Full Ounce, 23 FED. PROB. No. 2 20, 21 (1959); see also
Shelton, supra note 3, at 122, in which the author notes that authorities generally assume
that an inmate with a detainer, no matter what its form or substance, must be watched
more carefully. Prison administrators feel, that an inmate wanted by another criminal
justice agency, especially for another charge, is a greater escape risk. The effect of this
fear is that no one wants to make the hard decision between the relative risk of law
violation at the present time and the long term gain if the parolee is allowed freedom to
develop rehabilitative contacts with the outside world. Custodial classification of
detainer prisoners, Shelton feels, should be based upon an individual evaluation process
in order to prevent unnecessary curtailment of a prisoner's freedom.
90. Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667, 673 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974). In emphasizing the factor of the intervening sentence, the
court said that it did not ignore the fact that the prisoner may have been disadvantaged
in certain respects by the deferral of the revocation hearing, but went on to note that it
was unable to conclude that the disadvantage constituted grievous loss so as to require
the hearing prior to service of the intervening sentence. Noorlander v. United States
Att'y Gen., 465 F.2d 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973)
rationalized the effects of the detainer by the fact of the underlying conviction.
91. 465 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973).
92. id. at 1109.
93. Id.
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offense upon which the detainer was based had not resulted in conviction.
Implicit in the holding that an intervening conviction provides a rational
basis for sustaining the detainer's adverse effects is the assumption that an
incarcerated prisoner has no liberty worthy of constitutional protection.
9 4 It
has been urged that the possible loss of individual liberty which was the focal
thrust of Morrissey, is not present in a detainer situation because the
individual is already incarcerated. 95
The second reason for the court's reluctance to scrutinize the effects of
parole revocation detainers in due process terms is an unwillingness to
interfere with the administrative expertise of the detainer-requesting authori-
ties. 96 In one case, the prisoner asserted that the deferral of the revocation
hearing coupled with the presence of the detainer caused him great anxiety
and interfered with the rehabilitation process because it is difficult for a
parolee prisoner to become motivated while laboring under the uncertain
prospect of further imprisonment following completion of his current sen-
tence.9 7  The court responded, "We are simply unqualified unauthorized
and unwilling to second guess the parole board on a matter so peculiarly
within its own expertise."98  Warren Burger, now Chief Justice, writing in
Hyser v. Reed,99 said, "The function of the parole board involves the
application of blended concepts of criminology, penology and psychology,
and if the doctrine of 'administrative expertise' should carry weight anywhere
it should do so in this area."'100
A Detainer's Adverse Effects Outweigh the Other Interests Involved
Whether parole violator warrants lodged as detainers cause grievous
loss in terms of due process depends on a balancing of the interests
involved. 101 Before the balancing test is applied there must be a determina-
tion of whether the interest of the parolee affected by the detainer is within
the "liberty" protected by due process. Wolff v. McDonnell'0 2 sustains the
conculsion that an incarcerated prisoner has liberty worthy of constitutional
protection. In that case the Supreme Court established the application of
Morrissey's due process protections to prisoners still in the penitentiary as
94. See cases cited note 50 supra.
95. See cases cited note 50 supra.
96. See cases cited note 50 supra.
97. Cook v. United States Att'y Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 846 (1974).
98. Id. at 673. But see Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974)
(rejecting the theory that a district court should not interfere with internal prison
management especially where the conditions of confinement may cause a prisoner
grievous loss in constitutional terms).
99. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
100. Id. at 227.
101. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
102. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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well as to those at liberty on parole. This clarification undercuts the
argument that possible loss of individual liberty is not present in a detainer
situation because the individual is already incarcerated. As the Supreme
Court emphasized in Wolff, the objectives of the correctional system may
diminish a prisoner's rights, yet, imprisonment for crime cannot deprive the
prisoner of constitutional protections.103
Though delay of the parole revocation decision has no influence on the
duration of the present confinement which is based on the conviction for the
intervening crime, the fact remains that the delay decision triggers the
detainer mechanism which will affect the prisoner's conditions of confine-
ment and his opportunities for rehabilitation causing him "grievous loss." As
recognized by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Hooey,0 4 a detainer lodged
against a prisoner whose trial is being delayed until completion of the
intervening sentence subjects the prisoner to grievous loss in due process
terms.10
5
It is in their effect upon the prisoner and our attempts to rehabili-
tate him that detainers are most corrosive. The strain of having
to serve a sentence with the uncertain prospect of being taken into
the custody of another state at the conclusion interferes with the
prisoner's ability to take maximum advantage of his institutional
opportunities. His anxiety and depression may leave him with
little inclination toward self-improvement.108
A parolee whose revocation hearing is similarly delayed suffers from the
same emotional stress due to the uncertainty as to whether or not he faces
further confinement.
The exclusivity of the requesting authority's administrative decision-
making concerning what information it supplies to the custodial authority
must be balanced against its effect on the prisoner's interests.' 0 7  In
practice, due to the many forms and sources of detainers, prisoners are
placed on detentive status on the basis of different degrees of information
and not as a result of applying "blended concepts of criminology, penology
and psychology.' 0  Many requests for detention do not even state the
substance of the underlying charge. 109  Rarely, if ever, is the possible
103. Id. at 555.
104. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
105. The Supreme Court in Smith, although not directly concerned with delayed
revocation hearings, but rather with speedy trial for criminal indictments, did substantiate
their findings of grievous loss to the prisoner as well as to the state by the use of a
detainer. The Court interviewed the former Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons to
confirm the fact that detainers lodged against a prisoner whose hearing is delayed
subjected the prisoner to grievous loss in due process terms.
106. 393 U.S at 379.
107. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
108. Dauber, supra note 9, at 673.
109. Id. at 672.
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penalty noted, 110 and, in most cases, the requesting authority does not make
known its intention with regard to pursuing the detainer. 1" These factors
combine to leave prison officials without substantive bases for their ac-
tions. '1 2  Programming for the inmate cannot be undertaken intelligently,
and in view of the rather uniform belief that inmates with detainers are
escape risks, even that programming which can be attempted is further
limited by the restrictions placed on the mobility of such inmates." 83
Allowing the requesting authority complete discretion in disclosing informa-
tion forming the basis for its detention request prevents the agency most
qualified from exercising its expertise. It is the present custodial authority,
not the requesting authority, that can best make decisions affecting the
prisoner's conditions of confinement and rehabilitation.114 Thus, the inter-
ests of the prisoner in being treated fairly and on a rational basis are
sufficient to outweigh any interests of the requesting authority based on
control of its own administrative procedures.
Even in regard to the custodial authority's interest in penalizing the
prisoner or preventing his escape, the further curtailment of the prisoner's
liberty via the detainer should not be sustained without precedural due
process. 1 5 Approving the effects of the detainer simply on the rationale
that the past record and behavior of the prisoner as evidenced by the
detainer justifies its adverse effects violates the spirit of due process. The
resulting effects of a detainer on the prisoner's conditions of confinement and
opportunities for rehabilitation support the conclusion that there is a need for
a procedure by which the custodial authority is required to establish the




112. ld. at 673, 674. A study of the detainer system in Massachusetts revealed that
the process is used by a wide variety of criminal justice agencies to meet a variety of
needs. These needs are reflected in the informal development of different types of
detainers. It was discovered that the information about filed detainers that was available
to prison administrators, those who must consider the detainers in their treatment of the
inmates, was often incomplete and sometimes inaccurate. No one had a clear statistical
picture of the role of detainers in their particular agency; nor in many cases were the
procedures for handling detainers very clear. Written guidelines were generally nonexis-
tent. Decision-making was summary and often automatic. The effect of such chaos was
to make the operation of the detainer system practically invisible and, thus, to increase
the difficulty of discovering the locus of responsibility for detainer decisions within the
individual agencies.
113. Dauber, supra note 9, at 693 notes that closely related to the effect on
rehabilitation is the effect on prison planning for the inmate. The lack of complete
information on the inmate's future status makes intelligent long-term planning impossi-
ble. The result is likely to be ineffective or piecemeal planning, which usually is
unproductive and wasteful.
114. Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308, 314 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1973).
115. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
NOTES
RECOMMENDATIONS
The balancing test which due process demands requires close scrutiny of
the effects of the detainer system. Decisions considering the constitutional
validity of detainer effects have notably lacked an in-depth examination of
the actual detainer process. The federal courts, for the most part, have
failed to examine the detainer process in the particular institution before
rendering a decision concerning the effect of detainers on a prisoner's
conditions of confinement in that institution."1 6 No federal court, whether
in favor of or opposed to parole revocation delay via the detainer mecha-
nism, has based its judgment on the policies of the particular institution
involved. 1' The detainer problem has been dealt with superficially, and
general authorities have been relied upon for conclusions about the effects of
detainers."18 The decisions have failed to recognize the crucial fact that not
only do the effects of detainers vary from institution to institution" 9 but
there are different types of detainers which themselves have varying effects
on a prisoner's conditions.1
20
Courts which have found that the effects of a parole revocation detainer
constitute grievous loss support their reasoning with conclusory statements
rather than investigation.' 21 The Seventh Circuit did so in Hahn when it
stated: "The detainers curtail freedom, deprive prisoners of trusty status,
rehabilitation and education programs and subject prisoners to classifications
which are further freedom denying."' 22 At least one decision was based on
a more thorough investigation. The Supreme Court in Smith v. Hooey,12
although concerned with speedy trials for criminal indictments rather than
delayed parole revocation hearings, substantiated a finding of grievous loss
resulting from a detainer by interviewing the former Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons.
2 4
Failure to conduct a detailed inquiry into the detainer process overlooks
one very cogent argument for sustaining the constitutional validity of a
detainer in a particular case. The effect of a detainer in a particular
institution, because of its internal administrative policies, might not be
adverse to a prisoner's conditions of confinement.' 25 This situation could
116. See cases cited note 4 supra.
117. See cases cited note 4 supra.
118. See, e.g., DAwsoN, supra note 70, at 283 which is representative of a general
study frequently referred to, yet its use is inadequate because the nature and effects of the
detainer process differ from institution to institution as pointed out by Dauber, supra
note 9, at 670 and Shelton, supra note 3, at 122.
119. Dauber, supra note 9, at 670.
120. Id.
121. See cases cited note 4 supra.
122. United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975).
123. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
124. Id. at 378. The Director stressed that detainers have a corrosive effect on a
prisoner's morale as well as on attempts to rehabilitate him.
125. Shelton, supra note 3, at 122.
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arise in at least two cases. First, where a prison offers no rehabilitation
programs and every prisoner is equally "deprived" regardless of the existence
of a detainer, the argument that detainers caused grievous loss is not
compelling.1 26 Second, where the prison officials tailor custodial conditions
to the nature of the detainer, 127 they would neither impose burdensome
classifications 128 nor deny rehabilitation programs unless the nature of the
detainer justified such action.
129
The lack of uniformity in the area of detainers often results in invalid
conclusions based on generalized studies. Until the detainer process is made
more uniform, courts will have to look into the actual effect of the detainer
on the confinement conditions and the rehabilitation opportunities of the
prisoner involved in the particular case. In Hahn, the Seventh Circuit
focused the test for grievous loss in the area of either evidence, concurrent
sentences or detainers on the notion of "curtailment of liberty."1 0  But
even in applying this narrow test to detainers, the court must look into
the policy of each prison administration with regard to detainers to
determine two factors. First, whether the particular institution offers any op-
portunities which a detainer would adversely affect, and second, whether a
parole revocation detainer has in fact'such a liberty-depriving effect in that
institution. Requiring prompt revocation hearings, as Hahn did, will elimi-
nate the parole revocation detainer, but it can be replaced by a consecutive
sentence detainer unless the parole board sentences the violator concurrent-
ly. Although the early hearing reduces the likelihood of evidence disappear-
ing and gives the prisoner a chance to plead for a concurrent sentence, it
does nothing to eliminate the effects of the detainer that will be lodged if a
consecutive sentence is imposed. Thus, a prompt revocation hearing is not
the total answer to the detainer problem.
A solution to the delay-detainer problem will have to both meet the
needs of the various agencies utilizing detainers and eliminate the adverse
effects on the prisoner's institutional conditions.18 1 One solution proposed
by the American Bar Association is for legislatures to provide that in no
event should detainers in any way affect the conditions of serving a
sentence.' 8 2 At the very least the underlying charges of detainers should be
126. ld. Shelton points out that Indiana does not have work-release or study release
programs.
127. Dauber, supra note 9, at 692. Dauber notes that in Massachusetts when prison
personnel do look into the nature of the detainer, prisoners with an other-charges
detainer or consecutive-sentence detainer from another jurisdiction are not permitted to
participate in certain work-release programs. However, inmates with parole or probation
violations or those whose detainers are based on very minor charges, e.g. nonsupport,
illegitimacy, traffic violations, etc. are not restricted in this way.
128. id. at 697, 698.
129. Id. at 692.
130. United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975).
131. Dauber, supra note 9, at 699.
132. Note, Detainers and the Correctional Process, 16 WAsH. U.L.Q. 417, 439
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explicit and the prison authorities should be required to look into the nature
of the detainer to insure that any deprivations imposed are related to some
rational correctional goal. The prisoner should be notified of the existence
of the detainer and some type of review of the validity of the detainer should
be promptly held, not necessarily conditioned upon a request, in order to




Recent decisions have concluded that parolees who commit intervening
crimes do suffer grievous loss when the revocation hearing is delayed until
the intervening sentence is served.'3 4  The reasoning of these courts illus-
trates an enlightened understanding of both the purpose of the revocation
hearing and the impact of delay on the parolee's liberty. These courts
recognize the need for a prompt hearing because of the effects of delay on
reincarceration, evidence and sentencing. They also recognize the grievous
effects of the parole revocation warrant lodged as a detainer on the
prisoner's conditions of confinement and opportunities for rehabilitation.
It should be noted, however, that these courts have failed to integrate
the constitutional problems raised by detainers into their overall solution to
the delay problem. The prompt hearing requirement will not necessarily
eliminate the adverse effects caused by the detainer since it may remain
intact, after the hearing, as a consecutive sentence detainer with the same
limiting effects on the parolee's liberty. Thus, the due process violation
(1966) states: "The primary goal in solving the detainer problem is to insure to the
extent possible, identical treatment of one accused of multi-jurisdictional offenses and
one accused of the same crimes against a single jurisdiction."
133. Dauber, supra note 9, at 699-716; Shelton, supra note 3, at 119. It should be
noted that some efforts have been made to deal with the administrative complexities of
the detainer system. In 1955 the Council of State Governments formed the Committee
on Detainers and Sentencing and Release of Persons Accused of Multiple Offenses. This
committee proposed two types of legislation: (1) an act for the mandatory disposition of
intrastate detainers and (2) an interstate agreement for the mandatory disposition of
detainers from outside the incarcerating jurisdiction. Both of these statutes provide for
notice to the inmate of detainers and, upon the inmate's demand, a time limitation for
trial which if exceeded will result in dismissal of the underlying charge with prejudice.
The basic components of the intrastate statute (published in 1958 in modified form as
the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act) have been enacted in many
states. Thirty-seven states, including Illinois, and the federal government have become
parties to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers which resolves many of the transferral
problems previously encountered between jurisdictions.
These statutes, while improving somewhat the technical efficiency of the detainer
system, do not get at the heart of the problem-the adverse effect of the pending
detainer on the inmate's treatment. Nor do these statutes even address the filing end of
the process, where detainers are often lodged routinely with little thought about the
merits of the underlying charges. Dauber, supra note 9, at 671, 672.
134. See cases cited note 34 supra.
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attributable to the detainer would not be eliminated. This due process
violation would in effect amplify the consecutive sentencing penalty.
These decisions illustrate the need for a new approach to the problem
which goes beyond the requirement of a prompt hearing to eliminate the
grievous loss which delay causes. The only complete solution to the liberty
deprivations caused by the delay-detainer process at both the federal and
state levels is a prompt hearing in conjunction with removal of the adverse
effects of detainers where they serve no rational correctional purpose.
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